Bangladesh’s Law-and-Order Moment Ahead of the 2026 Election: What’s Happening, and Why the Legal Framework Matters

Abu Rahat Murshed Kabir | 21 December 2025

Bangladesh is entering an election season under the shadow of a question that is never merely technical: who can guarantee public safety without turning public order into political control? In January 2026, the security conversation has sharpened in ways that are difficult to ignore. Reports point to heightened concern about unrest, threats surrounding diplomatic facilities, and anxiety about violence as the February 12, 2026 general election approaches.

At the same time, this is not simply a story about street-level volatility. It is also a story about institutions and law: the constitutional promises Bangladesh makes to citizens, the statutory powers the state gives to police and security agencies, and the legal tests that determine when “maintaining order” becomes an excuse to shrink civic space. If you want to understand Bangladesh’s law-and-order reality today, you have to look at both layers together.

The present security climate: fear, uncertainty, and the politics of protection

In late January 2026, international attention has focused on security warnings connected to Bangladesh. Reuters reported that India decided to withdraw families and dependents of its diplomats from Bangladesh due to “mounting security concerns” ahead of the election. Separately, reporting has described repeated protests and disruption, including fear among international students and the destabilizing effects of shutdowns and unrest.

There are also claims and counterclaims about the capacity of the state to control violence. A recurring theme in recent coverage is the possibility of weapons circulating outside state control and the fear that political competition may become more violent in the run-up to voting. Even if you treat every such report with caution, the basic pattern is clear: public order is becoming a political issue because it affects the credibility of the electoral environment.

The constitutional baseline: Bangladesh’s promise of rights, and the state’s duty to protect

Bangladesh’s Constitution is not silent on public order. It anchors a citizen’s expectation that the state must both protect life and liberty and ensure that government power is exercised “in accordance with law.” Article 32 states that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.

That sounds straightforward, but in periods of tension it becomes the core dispute: what counts as “in accordance with law” when police are dispersing protests, when preventive detention is invoked, or when speech-related security laws are enforced? The constitutional idea is not that the state can never act strongly. It is that strong action must be legally grounded, proportionate, and reviewable.

The Constitution also recognises assembly rights, subject to “reasonable restrictions” in the interests of public order and other aims. This is the classic democratic balancing act: allow peaceful participation while restricting violence and threats. The practical challenge is how often, and how loosely, restrictions are used.

Policing powers: old statutes, modern realities

Bangladesh’s policing structure still rests heavily on colonial-era legal frameworks, including the Police Act, 1861. That matters because statutes shape supervision and discipline, and they define how force is organised. The Police Act’s design assumes a model of administrative control and a chain of command oriented toward maintaining order. In a modern democracy, that model must coexist with constitutional rights and judicial scrutiny.

Then there is criminal procedure: the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC), still central to arrests, searches, investigations, and magistrate oversight. During unrest, the real-world effect is immediate. Questions such as “Was the arrest lawful?” or “Was detention extended properly?” or “Was a search conducted with required safeguards?” determine whether order is being maintained through law or through fear.

Elections and legitimacy: why “law and order” is never neutral

In an election context, “law and order” rhetoric tends to do two things at once:

It can be a genuine call for security so citizens can vote without intimidation.
It can become a political instrument to restrict opponents, choke assembly, or criminalise protest.

Bangladesh’s recent political transitions heighten that tension. Reporting has described the interim government’s political decisions, including a ban on activities of the Awami League under the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2025, illustrating how security law can be used in high-stakes political moments.

None of this automatically tells you whether a given action is justified. It does tell you what citizens should ask: What is the legal basis? Is it time-limited? Is there due process? Can courts review it? Are the rules being applied evenly?

The danger zone: when “public order” crowds out “public trust”

Public order is not only the absence of violence. It is also the presence of legitimacy. A state can reduce street disorder temporarily through heavy-handed tactics, but if people conclude that police power is partisan, the state may be creating future instability.

This is where constitutional rights matter most. Article 32’s promise of liberty “in accordance with law” is not just a phrase. It is supposed to function as a brake. When citizens fear arbitrary arrest, or when people believe speech laws are used selectively, they stop trusting the system, and they stop cooperating with it.

What to watch: five legal questions that will define the months ahead

If you’re tracking Bangladesh’s law-and-order trajectory toward the February 2026 election, the most useful lens is legal and procedural:

Use of arrest and remand: Are CrPC powers used narrowly and with documented grounds, or broadly to disrupt opponents?
Management of assemblies: Are restrictions tailored to violence risk, or used to suppress peaceful mobilisation?
Preventive measures: Is preventive detention invoked, and if so, are constitutional safeguards followed?
Anti-terror framework: Are “national security” claims tied to credible threats or stretched to cover ordinary political activity?
Digital enforcement: Are cyber laws used to curb incitement and disinformation, or to silence critics?

Bangladesh’s present moment is not just a security problem. It is a constitutional test. And in constitutional tests, the details matter: legal basis, proportionality, oversight, and equality before the law.

Bangladesh’s Descent into Despair: A Nation Betrayed by Cowardice and Capitulation

By Abu Rahat Murshed Kabir | 5 November 2025

Let us dispense with all pretense and confront the unvarnished truth. Bangladesh is not simply passing through a temporary hardship or transitional turbulence. It is undergoing a profound internal collapse, ravaged by abject cowardice, hollow ethical posturing, and a willful avoidance of the surging threat of Islamist extremism—all while those in authority drape themselves in illusions of moral superiority. This erosion did not manifest overnight. There were no dramatic military interventions or overt declarations of emergency. What emerged instead was a more treacherous and humiliating trajectory: a leadership that opted for complacency over conviction, evasion over obligation. In the era dominated by the Muhammad Yunus-led interim administration and its affiliated networks, Bangladesh did not attain heightened ethical integrity. It forfeited its political fortitude entirely.

Hollow Declarations, Forsaken Responsibility

The gravest falsehood inflicted upon the populace was the assertion that eloquent proclamations of principle constitute genuine governance. They do not.

Endless invocations of impartiality ring empty when confronted with rampant, coordinated radicalism; such purported neutrality amounts to nothing less than capitulation. A regime that perpetually advocates dialogue as extremists consolidate influence over public spheres is not displaying wisdom—it is betraying unmistakable trepidation. The Yunus administration did not elevate itself beyond factional strife. It isolated itself from tangible realities. Rather than grappling with stark verities, it shrouded itself in ambiguous humanitarian rhetoric, superficial diplomatic gestures, and interminable deliberations on inclusivity. Concurrently, street-level conditions transformed—insidiously, aggressively, and irrevocably. Islamist radicalism did not erupt spontaneously. It permeated society because authorities steadfastly refused to name it accurately. Whenever extremist conduct was reframed as legitimate religious fervor, radicals gained advantage. Whenever incendiary discourse was endured to avert discord, their momentum intensified. This pattern was no mere lapse. It represented calculated evasion. Radicalism demands no explicit sanction—merely official inattention. And inattention was lavished in abundance.

Discourse grew ever more inflexible. Informal enforcement proliferated. Apprehension normalized. Taciturn acquiescence evolved into a survival imperative. This does not represent peaceful harmony. It constitutes unconditional submission. Recent events underscore this capitulation vividly. In October 2025, following the assassination of prominent youth leader Alauddin a figure associated with the 2024 uprising—unrest swept the nation, including arson targeting media outlets and cultural venues. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, from exile, accused the Yunus regime of powerlessness, asserting that lawlessness has escalated dramatically, with extremists emboldened to target minorities and diplomatic entities. Reports document a slaughter of Awamileague man in Dhaka over alleged blasphemy, alongside widespread protests condemning administrative inaction.

Human rights monitors recorded over 2,900 incidents of violence against minorities under the interim government, including killings, arson, and land seizures. False blasphemy accusations fueled 71–73 attacks on Hindus between June and October 2025 alone, across dozens of districts. Temples vandalized, homes torched, families terrorized—all while authorities hesitated or denied responsibility.

Justice Hollowed Out, Not Simply Inadequate

The judicial apparatus did not stumble due to mere inefficiency. It was systematically undermined by apathy and selective enforcement. Proceedings extend indefinitely. Intimidations escape repercussion. Offenses rooted in bigotry dissolve into administrative obscurity. The implication is unequivocal: those sufficiently vocal, cohesive, and ideologically militant can anticipate governmental reluctance. Such reluctance proves catastrophic. When adjudication becomes discretionary, legal frameworks devolve into superficiality. Upon realizing institutions offer no safeguard, public confidence in governance evaporates. This is no incidental flaw. It signifies institutionalized decay.

Critics highlight mass arrests without due process, revocation of journalist accreditations, and proposed cyber laws threatening further restrictions on expression. While some repressive sections of prior digital security acts were repealed, concerns persist over provisions enabling harassment of dissenters.

The Most Vulnerable Deliberately Forsaken

Women received counsel to adapt. Minorities were exhorted to endure quietly. LGBTQ+ individuals were effectively erased from consideration. This was no even-handed approach. It embodied deliberate abandonment. A polity that apportions protection selectively ceases to function as a true polity—it becomes gatekeeper for ascendant factions. Leadership that neglects the defenseless relinquishes all credible legitimacy. Restraint in these domains was not discretion. It represented ethical bankruptcy.

Violence against Hindus surged: lynchings, temple desecrations, forced displacements. Protests erupted internationally, including outside Bangladesh missions in India. Christians faced disruptions to celebrations; women endured escalating harassment. The regime’s responses—condemnations without decisive action—exacerbated perceptions of complicity through inaction.

Youth Abandoned, Recruited by Radicals

Young citizens did not gravitate toward radicalism from inherent folly or depravity. They gravitated because the state extended no viable alternatives—no employment, no horizon, no meaningful participation. As officials preoccupied themselves with appearances of refinement, extremist networks extended crude yet compelling inducements: rigid assurance, communal bonds, designated scapegoats. This dynamic arises when administration prioritizes symbolism over substance. Radicalization cannot be neutralized via symposia. It requires furnishing compelling incentives for institutional allegiance. That prospect was utterly neglected.

Economic stagnation compounded despair: inflation exceeding 10–12%, reserves plummeting, growth projections halved. Unemployment and uncertainty drove vulnerable youth toward extremist certainties. Corruption Concealed Beneath Facade of Rectitude

Corruption in this period eschewed overt transactions. It proved more subtle and pernicious. It appeared in shirked duties, bartered enforcement for fleeting calm, tolerance of radical operations deemed too disruptive to challenge. This constitutes dereliction of duty. Its consequences are devastating. Allegations persist of released terrorists, lifted bans on proscribed groups, and accommodations yielding to radical pressures—evidenced by adviser resignations amid claims of extremist influence.

Yearning for Order Betokens Profound Rupture

When citizens reminisce that prior eras offered predictability, democratic vitality is already severely compromised. They do not endorse autocracy. They indict present frailty. A state incapable of upholding its mandates provokes longing for authoritarian resolve. Such longing signals democracy’s terminal decline. With elections slated for February 2026, tensions mount: BNP figures return amid massive rallies; Awami League banned; Islamist parties positioned to exploit divisions.

Inescapable Bleak Trajectory

Absent reversal, Bangladesh will not abruptly adopt rigid theocracy. It will deteriorate into a more insidious affliction: a fear-saturated, self-silencing society where conformity eclipses legality, and menace supplants orderly rule. Creativity suppressed. Freedoms extinguished. Confidence annihilated. Merely compliance and stagnation endure. Recent unrest—riots, media attacks, minority persecutions—portends deepening instability. Diplomatic strains with India intensify over perceived failures to protect minorities and curb anti-India rhetoric.

Ultimate Betrayal: Acquiescence Masquerading as Sagacity

Abandon all delusion. The paramount transgression was not radicalism per se. It was acquiescence cloaked as prudence. History extends no mercy to polities that neglect self-preservation. It disregards rhetorical elegance amid capitulation. Bangladesh demands no additional vague moral dialogues. It requires unyielding resolve.

Prolong this decay, and precious little will remain salvageable.

ECONOMIC DISRUPTION AND ACCELERATION OF CORRUPTION DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

Mohammd Zahin

Bangladesh’s economy entered the post–5 August phase carrying unresolved vulnerabilities: foreign reserve depletion, inflation, banking-sector fragility, and investor uncertainty. Transitional instability magnified these issues, creating fertile ground for corruption, market manipulation, and economic exploitation.

This article analyzes how the governance crisis intensified economic hardship, institutional corruption, and uneven wealth extraction.

1. Vulnerable Economic Foundations Before the Transition

Years of structural economic weaknesses left Bangladesh exposed:

Banking scandals had already eroded public confidence
Government borrowing and debt obligations increased
Foreign investment slowed due to political uncertainty
Inflation rose due to global shocks and local mismanagement
Trade deficits widened

These conditions meant any political transition—peaceful or turbulent—would create economic aftershocks.

2. Market Shock After 5 August: Immediate Economic Effects

Immediately after the transition:

Liquidity tightened as depositors withdrew savings
Importers faced delays in LCs due to currency instability
Business confidence declined sharply
Transport disruptions increased logistical costs
Prices of essentials skyrocketed

These were not intentional outcomes but rather the natural consequences of uncertainty and weakened administrative control.

3. Rise of Opportunistic Market Manipulation

In periods of instability, markets become easier to exploit.

a. Syndicates Accelerated Price Manipulation

Artificial shortages of rice, oil, sugar
Hoarding of basic commodities
Rapid price hikes in both retail and wholesale markets
Smuggling of essentials across borders

Weak market monitoring allowed syndicates to operate with impunity.

b. Corruption in Subsidy and Relief Distribution

Reports indicated:

Misallocation of relief goods
Local-level political capture of food aid
Bribes demanded for access to social safety nets
Diversion of subsidized goods into black markets

Such corruption intensified public frustration.

c. Banking Sector Instability

Banks experienced:

Increased non-performing loans
Poor oversight as regulatory attention shifted to political stability
Collusion in loan approvals
Money laundering through under-invoicing and over-invoicing

Financial institutions became vulnerable to predatory behavior.

4. Breakdown of Revenue Systems and the Rise of Informal Extraction

Customs and Ports

Corruption surged due to:

Reduced central oversight
Officers exploiting confusion
Rise of informal payments to clear goods faster

Local Government Revenue

Municipalities saw:

Informal toll collection
Unauthorized taxes
Extortion in markets and transport hubs

Land Administration

Weak supervision enabled:

Illegal land occupation
Irregular land transfers with forged documents
Bribery for mutation and registration

These practices represent structural governance failure.

5. Investment Freeze and Capital Flight

Investors—both domestic and foreign—responded to transitional instability by:

Canceling scheduled investments
Pausing manufacturing expansion
Moving funds to safer jurisdictions
Delaying startup launches and export contracts

The garment industry, the backbone of exports, suffered from:

Delayed shipments
Worker unrest
Supply-chain disruptions
Lower buyer confidence

Investor sentiment hinges on predictability; during this period, predictability was absent.

6. Widening Inequality: How Transitional Instability Hurt Ordinary Citizens

Economic hardship disproportionately impacted:

Daily wage earners
Small traders
Farmers
Informal-sector workers
Low-income urban households

Their challenges included:

High food prices
Loss of employment
Reduced purchasing power
Limited access to healthcare
Increased reliance on debt

Meanwhile, economic opportunists benefited from:

Market manipulation
Informal toll systems
Arbitrage in essential goods
Corruption-enabled resource capture

This widened the gap between elite groups and vulnerable citizens.

7. Pathways to Economic Stabilization

Bangladesh requires:

Anti-corruption audit teams independent of political influence
Restoration of investor confidence through policy continuity
Strengthening central bank autonomy
Price monitoring mechanisms
Reforms in customs, VAT, and land governance
Transparency tools for procurement
Social-protection expansion for the most vulnerable

Economic stability requires institutional—not personal—solutions.

Conclusion

Corruption and economic disruption after 5 August were the result of institutional fragility amplified by political uncertainty. The crisis revealed the urgent need for durable, depoliticized economic governance capable of surviving leadership transitions.

ARTICLE 3 — SOCIAL UNREST, HUMAN-RIGHTS RISKS, AND PUBLIC INSECURITY DURING THE POST–5 AUGUST PERIOD

Introduction

The post–5 August period marked one of the most unstable phases in Bangladesh’s social landscape. With the public unsure of the direction of the state, longstanding social tensions resurfaced, new conflicts emerged, and human-rights conditions deteriorated due to weakened oversight.

This article examines the social dimensions of unrest during this period: community violence, breakdown of mediation systems, targeting of minorities, gender-based violence, and erosion of civic safety.

1. Social Tension Under Transitional Uncertainty

Transitions create fear. Fear creates rumors. Rumors create violence.

In Bangladesh, pre-existing polarization meant any leadership change—no matter the type—risked igniting dormant tensions.

Factors fueling unrest included:

Revenge violence between partisan groups
Breakdown of local dispute-resolution systems
Misinformation campaigns on social media
Distrust in law enforcement
Uncertainty about future political alignments

Violence was not coordinated by a single actor; it emerged from a vacuum of authority.

2. Escalation of Community-Level Violence

Political Clashes

After 5 August:

Political activists clashed with opponents
Supporters of different factions engaged in turf battles
Vandalism targeted party offices, homes, and businesses

Mob Justice

Weak policing triggered:

Public lynchings
Vigilante groups
Attacks based on rumors of theft, blasphemy, or political affiliation

Looting

Markets, shops, and transport vehicles faced:

Coordinated looting by criminal groups
Opportunistic theft by local gangs
Destruction of property during protests

3. Increased Risks for Women and Marginalized Groups

Periods of instability often increase gender-based violence. Reports highlighted:

Rise in sexual harassment and assault
Domestic violence escalation due to economic strain
Limited access to police protection
Difficulties accessing justice mechanisms

Minority communities faced:

Targeted intimidation
Attacks on places of worship
Forced displacement
Property destruction

Such incidents reflect systemic vulnerability, not the intent of transitional leadership.

4. Weakening of Human-Rights Monitoring Mechanisms

Human-rights organizations reported:

Reduced access to detention centers
Difficulty tracking extrajudicial violence
Slow or absent investigations
Breakdowns in documentation processes

Transitional governments often deprioritize rights protection in favor of political stabilization. This occurred here as well.

5. Media, Misinformation, and Public Panic

Misinformation Circulated Rapidly

Rumors included:

False reports of political reprisals
Invented stories of community attacks
Claims of impending state collapse
Manipulated videos to incite violence

Media Under Pressure

Journalists faced:

Threats from political groups
Restricted access to conflict zones
Self-censorship

The information vacuum magnified public fear.

6. Breakdown of Social Cohesion

Neighborhoods fragmented because:

People feared association with political factions
Trust between communities weakened
Economic hardship deepened social resentment
Religious tensions were exploited by opportunists

Social cohesion—an essential part of peace—was severely strained.

7. Rebuilding Social Stability: Necessary Steps

Bangladesh requires:

Community reconciliation programs
Protection mechanisms for vulnerable groups
Independent human-rights monitoring
Rapid legal reforms to protect victims
Media literacy campaigns
Revival of local mediation councils
Depoliticization of security forces

Transition periods must prioritize human security above all else.

Conclusion

The unrest following 5 August was not a product of personal leadership failure but a symptom of deep societal fractures exacerbated by institutional weakness. Durable stability will require rebuilding trust, strengthening rights protections, and restoring credibility in state institutions.

GOVERNANCE VACUUM AND STATE CAPACITY BREAKDOWN AFTER 5 AUGUST

Mohammad Zahin, Special Report

The political transition following 5 August created one of the most turbulent governance periods in Bangladesh’s recent history. A nation long accustomed to strong executive authority suddenly found itself navigating an uncertain administrative structure, unclear chains of command, overstretched institutions, and a crisis of public trust. Although any transitional authority faces challenges, the scale and speed of Bangladesh’s deterioration exposed deeper structural weaknesses: fragile institutions, politicized administration, limited rule-of-law independence, and deep-rooted mistrust between citizens and the state.

This article examines how institutional instability during the post–5 August phase contributed to corruption risks, escalated violence, slowed service delivery, and generated a sense of pervasive uncertainty. It does not assign personal blame, but rather analyses the systemic issues that made the period volatile.

1. The Governance Vacuum: A Structural Weakness Decades in the Making

Bangladesh’s political system has long revolved around strong centralized authority. When that authority weakens abruptly, three things happen:

Institutional paralysis
Decision-making bottlenecks
Rapid fragmentation of accountability

Following 5 August, ministries, law enforcement agencies, and local administrations faced conflicting directives, unclear roles, and shifting reporting lines. Many officials reportedly adopted a “wait-and-see” posture, avoiding decisions that might later be scrutinized or reversed. This “administrative freeze” is a common feature of transitional democracies, but in Bangladesh it generated cascading disruption:

Delays in public procurement
Stalled infrastructure projects
Untouched corruption complaints
Inaction on local violence
Absence of coordinated crisis response

The collapse of administrative certainty enabled a spike in opportunistic behaviors, including looting, land grabbing, political score-settling, and local-level extortion.

2. Law Enforcement Under Stress: Lack of Coordination and Operational Clarity

A functioning state requires predictable law enforcement. After 5 August:

Some police units withdrew from streets fearing retaliation
Others acted independently without oversight
Coordination with district administration declined
Rapid Action Battalion operations slowed significantly
Emergency response systems became inconsistent

This inconsistency created opportunities for criminal groups and political opportunists to exploit power vacuums. Social media footage of vandalism, mob justice, arson, and targeted assaults reflected a system where deterrence collapsed.

Without clear chain-of-command, “law enforcement discretion” expanded dramatically—sometimes used responsibly, sometimes abused, and often simply absent.

3. Rise in Local Power Brokers and Informal Governance

When formal institutions weaken, informal power accelerates. After 5 August:

Local musclemen asserted territorial control
Political youth groups reactivated dormant networks
Extortion groups emerged around transport hubs
Rural disputes escalated into violence due to absent arbitration
Cross-party opportunists exploited shifting loyalties

This shift from formal to informal governance magnified corruption and insecurity. Citizens increasingly relied on local enforcers rather than the state, creating a climate where justice depended on power, not law.

4. Administrative Corruption: How Transitional Uncertainty Fuels Abuse

Corruption tends to spike in transitional periods because:

Oversight weakens
Procedural checks are relaxed
Officials expect rapid turnover
Short-term extraction replaces long-term policy

Reports from civil society groups, investigative journalists, and economic monitors indicated:

Accelerated bribery in licensing, land permissions, and police clearances
Irregularities in public procurement as monitoring agencies stalled
Informal payments becoming normalized in health and education services
Widening gap between official directives and street-level bureaucracy

Even if leadership discouraged corruption, the system lacked the capacity to enforce discipline across thousands of administrative nodes.

5. Social Unrest: Triggered by Fear, Exploited by Opportunists

The period witnessed:

Street clashes
Looting of shops and transport vehicles
Attacks on minority communities
Targeted violence against political rivals
Demonstrations turning into riots

Drivers included:

Fear of future repression depending on who gains power
Economic frustration due to inflation and unemployment
Politicization of student and youth groups
Social media misinformation accelerating panic
Absence of mediating institutions such as local councils or party structures

Unrest was not the product of a single cause or group—it emerged from systemic breakdown combined with public anxiety.

6. Public Trust Erosion: Citizens Left Without Predictability

Public trust declined because:

People could not rely on police protection
Courts struggled with caseload surges and administrative delays
Banks experienced liquidity anxieties
Prices of essentials fluctuated wildly
Public-health and municipal services slowed

When predictability disappears, people assume the worst. In such climates, rumors fuel conflict, markets destabilize, and individuals adopt self-protective behavior that further strains the system.

7. What Structural Reforms Are Needed

To prevent future governance collapse during transitions, Bangladesh would require:

Decentralized administrative authority
Nonpartisan civil service reform
Clear legal framework for interim governance
Strengthening of local-government institutions
Independent oversight of law enforcement
Depoliticization of public procurement
Digitization of administrative processes

These structural changes—not leadership changes—determine long-term stability.

Conclusion

The post–5 August situation in Bangladesh exposed deep systemic weaknesses. Instead of framing it as the failure of an individual, it is more accurate to describe it as the failure of institutions unprepared for abrupt transition. Governance vacuums generate corruption, violence, and public disorder not because of personal motives, but because institutions lack resilience.

নেত্রকোনায় সড়ক দুর্ঘটনায় পুলিশ সদস্যসহ নিহত ২

নেত্রকোনায় প্রাইভেটকার ও সিএনজিচালিত অটোরিকশার সংঘর্ষে পুলিশ সদস্যসহ দুইজন নিহত হয়েছেন। একই দুর্ঘটনায় আহত হয়েছেন আরও ৬ জন। শুক্রবার (২৬ জানুয়ারি) বিকেলে নেত্রকোনা-ময়মনসিংহ মহাসড়কের চল্লিশা ঝাউসী এলাকায় এ দুর্ঘটনা ঘটে।

নিহত পুলিশ সদস্য হলেন- জেলার বারহাট্রা উপজেলার ফকিরের বাজার তদন্ত কেন্দ্রের কনস্টেবল আজিজুল হাকিম। তার গ্রামের বাড়ি ময়মনসিংহের ফুলপুরে। এছাড়া নিহত অন্যজনের পরিচয় জানা যায়নি। আহতদের মধ্যে সঞ্জিত বর্মণ (৫৮) কে সনাক্ত করা গেছে। তার বাড়ি শাহাপাড়ার নাগ্রা।

নেত্রকোনা মডেল থানার এসআই মশিউল জানান, নেত্রকোনাগামী প্রাইভেটকারের সঙ্গে ময়মনসিংহগামী যাত্রীবোঝাই অটোরিকশার সংঘর্ষ হলে ঘটনাস্থলেই দুইজন নিহত ও ছয়জন আহত হন। নিহতরা অটোরিকশার যাত্রী ছিলেন। পরে স্থানীয়রা ও ফায়ার সার্ভিসের কর্মীরা আহতদের নেত্রকোনা সদর হাসপাতালে পাঠায়। সেখানে সঞ্জিত বর্মণসহ তিনজনের অবস্থা সংকটাপন্ন হওয়ায় উন্নত চিকিৎসার জন্য তাদের ময়মনসিংহ মেডিকেল কলেজ (মমেক) হাসপাতালে পাঠানো হয়।

নেত্রকোনায় সড়ক দুর্ঘটনায় পুলিশ সদস্যসহ নিহত ২

নেত্রকোনায় ঢাকা হতে আগত প্রাইভেটকার ও সিএনজিচালিত অটোরিকশার সংঘর্ষে পুলিশ সদস্যসহ দুইজন নিহত হয়েছেন। একই দুর্ঘটনায় আহত হয়েছেন আরও ৬ জন। সোমবার (৩১শে মার্চ) বিকেলে নেত্রকোনা-ময়মনসিংহ মহাসড়কের চল্লিশা ঝাউসী এলাকায় এ দুর্ঘটনা ঘটে।

নিহত পুলিশ সদস্য হলেন- জেলার বারহাট্রা উপজেলার ফকিরের বাজার তদন্ত কেন্দ্রের কনস্টেবল আজিজুল হাকিম। তার গ্রামের বাড়ি ময়মনসিংহের ফুলপুরে। এছাড়া নিহত অন্যজনের পরিচয় জানা যায়নি।গুরুতর আহতদের মধ্যে শাহাপাড়ার নাগ্রার সঞ্জিত বর্মণ (৫৮) ছাঁড়া অন্যদের সনাক্ত করা যায়নি। সঞ্জিত বর্মণ সহ তিনজনের অবস্থা আশঙ্কাজনক

নেত্রকোনা মডেল থানার এসআই মশিউল জানান, নেত্রকোনাগামী প্রাইভেটকারের সঙ্গে ময়মনসিংহগামী যাত্রীবোঝাই অটোরিকশার সংঘর্ষ হলে ঘটনাস্থলেই দুইজন নিহত ও পাঁচজন আহত হন। নিহতরা অটোরিকশার যাত্রী ছিলেন। পরে স্থানীয়রা ও ফায়ার সার্ভিসের কর্মীরা আহতদের নেত্রকোনা সদর হাসপাতালে পাঠায়। সেখানে তিনজনের অবস্থা সংকটাপন্ন হওয়ায় উন্নত চিকিৎসার জন্য তাদের ময়মনসিংহ মেডিকেল কলেজ (মমেক) হাসপাতালে পাঠানো হয়।

Case filed at Narail Court for political opinion

There is growing tension surrounding a magazine in Bangladesh, namely ‘Nabajug Magazine’. Apparently, the magazine is run by an individual called Md Rasel Miah, who has been accused of political defamation along with other writers while living abroad. The magazine “Nabajug” is facing charges of political defamation, among other offenses. The accused include the editor, writer(s), and contributors of the magazine. The case (54/2023) was filed on 23 March 2024 under Section 499 and 500 of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860 by one Mr.Bayezid Sheikh, at the Narail district court, Bangladesh. The case has been sent to the Police Bureau of Investigation (PBI), with the Investigation Report due on 25th April 2023.

Md Rasel Miah, Editor of Nabajug Magazine

According to court sources, the magazine contained offensive articles insulting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh and the father of the country’s current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The complainants allege that the magazine has defamed the government of Bangladesh, the judiciary, and the legal system. The accused, including the editor Md Rasel Miah, Md Mohiuddin Masud, Samiuzzaman Siddique, Md Nizam Uddin Dodun, Md Ashrah Hossain, jani Chandra Saha, Biplob Paul, Redwanur Rahman, Md Kamrul Hasan. Ali Amin and others have been charged.

Upon being questioned regarding the matter, the plaintiff in this case, Mr. Sheikh, expressed his displeasure towards the defendants. He asserted that their actions have warranted legal repercussions as they have not only disregarded the laws and constitution of the Bangladeshi government, but also targeted the revered Awami government. As a fervent supporter and activist of the Awami government, he firmly believes that strict legal action must be taken against the defendants to prevent any future harm to the government and its leadership. Additionally, he hinted that in the absence of proper legal measures, they may be compelled to take their own action against the defendants. However, when asked to clarify what he meant by “proper action,” Mr. Sheikh evaded the question.

Our team reached out to Jahangir Alam, the investigation officer of the Police Bureau of Investigation (Dhaka HQ), over the phone. Mr. Alam stated that they are currently investigating the matter and taking appropriate actions. He further mentioned that the accused individuals will soon be apprehended, and the law enforcement authorities will make every effort to ensure that they are brought to justice.

Criminal Case filed against Atheist Era magazine on the ground of blasphemy and other charges

A case on the ground of blasphemy has been filed in relation to the recent issue of a magazine called “Atheist Era”. The list of accused consists of 20 names including the Editor and other personnel of this magazine and the contributors/writers whose writing appeared on this issue.

Magistrate Ahmed Humayun Kabir, sitting at Court No. 06 of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrates’ Court, took cognizance of the case under Section 295 of the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860 on 20 November. The complainant in this case is a Md. Yasin Alam Bhuiyan. The case (CR-234/2022) has been sent to the Superintendent of Police of the Police Bureau of Investigation for investigation. The Investigation Report is due on 29 December this year.

Referring to the petiton of the case, the court sources said that the magazine did not only contain filthy articles insulting Islam but also criticized the elements of Islam existing in the legal system of Bangladesh. By doing so, in effect, it spread slanders against the government of Bangladesh, the judiciary and the lagal system. Extremely humiliating write-ups about the Holy Prophet Muhammad have also been published in the same magazine. Recognition of homosexuals/bisexuals, change or abolition of laws in this regard and Islamic fundamentalism were the subject matters of the write-ups in this magazine.

The accused of this case are, Md Arman Hossain (Editor), Tanvir Ahmed, Jishan Tanvir Mostofa, Zobayer Hossain, Md Jakir Hossain, Md Asaduzzaman Khan Rony, Johny Chandra Saha, Md Mohiuddin Masud, Imrul Kayes, Md Zahirul Islam, Johnny Joseph Costa, Asif Islam, Mohaiminul Biswas Parvez, Kamal Chandra Sarkar, K M Mahfuzur Rahman, Md Rasel Miah, Abu Bakar Siddik, Md Abdul Razzak, Mohammed Moin Uddin Chowdhury, and Md Al Amin Kaisar.

When contacted, the complainant Mr. Bhuiyan did not hold back his frustration and anger with the accused in the case. He said, “This magazine has been spreading conspiracies and slander against Islam for a long time, both online and offline, against the laws of Bangladesh, the laws that emphasize Islamic consciousness and values, and against the government of Bangladesh. We have filed this case lawfully. They are not only attacking the Islam but also the Government of Bangladesh and the law and constitution of our beloved Awami government. Especially, this atheists are plotting conspiracies against the existing law regarding atheists and homosexuals. As a supporter and activist of the Awami League I can tell that if these people are not brought under the law now our leader will be in great danger in future.”

Defamation Case Sparks Tension as Atheist Era Magazine Faces Legal Battle

In a significant development, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court of the capital witnessed the filing of a defamation case against the editor of “Atheist Era” magazine, Md. Arman Hossain, and 19 others. The plaintiff, Md. Yasin Alam Bhuiyan, alleges that the magazine has long been disseminating conspiracy and slander against Islam, the laws of Bangladesh, and the government.

The case, registered under Section 295 of the Criminal Code, was assigned to Judge Mr. Ahmed Humayun Kabir in Court No. 16. The judge has directed the Superintendent of Police of the Police Bureau of Investigation to conduct an inquiry into the matter. The deadline for the investigation report is set for December 29, 2022.

The accused include prominent names such as Editor Arman Hossain, Tanveer Ahmed, Komol Chandra Das, Zeeshan Tanveer Mostafa, Muhaiminul Biswas Parvez, Zobair Hossain, Asif Islam, Jani Chandra Saha, Jony Joseph Costa, among others. Tensions surrounding the case have been palpable, with suppressed anger observed in some areas.

In an interview, the plaintiff, Mr. Md. Yasin Alam Bhuiyan, expressed strong indignation, stating, “They have not only expressed their opposition to Islam but have also launched an assault on the laws and constitution of the government of Bangladesh. Strict legal measures must be taken unless the safety of our leader and nation is to be jeopardized in the future.”

The plaintiff hinted at possible repercussions if justice is not served through legal channels, leaving the nature of these repercussions unspecified. Meanwhile, court sources reported a tight security system in place with a sizable crowd supporting the plaintiff, resonating with chants of “Naraye Takbir Allah Hu Akbar.”

Police sources declined to comment on the matter, and attempts to contact the defendants, including the Atheist Era magazine, went unanswered. The case, registered as CR – 234/2022, marks a contentious intersection of freedom of expression, religious sentiments, and legal consequences.

Progress made in the investigation of the sedition case against The Daily Nobojug

By Staff Reporter on 30/10/2022

Recent media reports around the case of sedition brought by a member of the Bangabandhu Lawyers’ Association against the controversial The Daily Nobojug and some of its comment-contributors/readers on issues such as the Al-Jazeera’s hour-long documentary “All the Prime-Minister’s Men” and the controversial death of writer Mushtaq Ahmed in prison suggest that the investigation against the accused is in full flow and details are emerging as to their motive behind their actions leading to the charges. The offending article was published on The Daily Nobojug on 27 March 2021.

On the condition of anonymity, a reliable source from PBI (Police Bureau of Invesitagtion), which has been tasked with the investigation of the charges by the Additional Chief Magistrate Md. Hasibul Haque of Dhaka Metropolitan Magistrate Court – 05 by way of an order issued on 25 August 2021, has confirmed to TheBDNews24 that, on preliminary investigation, most of the accused appear to be based overseas, mainly in Europe and the US and it is clear that they are working closely, covertly and sometimes explicitly, with the dominant parts of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party which is currently being led by exiled BNP leader Tarique Rahman, to upset the harmony within the country and to create chaos and disorder by spreading confusion and misinformation about the government, armed forces and the judiciary.

Some identities have now been uncovered – Md Razim Hossain, Md Rukon Miah, Md Sabbir Hossain, Md Al Amin Kaisar, Md Masum Sajjad, Mohammad Shahidul Islam Jaigirdar, Md Ashif Hossain, and Ahsanul Huda Sarker. The responsible PBI team are tracking the whereabouts of these individuals and investigating these individuals’ local addresses. It is expected further progress will be made.

The investigation continues in this case (CR-120/2021).

The present security climate: fear, uncertainty, and the politics of protection

The constitutional baseline: Bangladesh’s promise of rights, and the state’s duty to protect

Policing powers: old statutes, modern realities

Elections and legitimacy: why “law and order” is never neutral

The danger zone: when “public order” crowds out “public trust”

What to watch: five legal questions that will define the months ahead

Hollow Declarations, Forsaken Responsibility

Justice Hollowed Out, Not Simply Inadequate

The Most Vulnerable Deliberately Forsaken

Youth Abandoned, Recruited by Radicals

Yearning for Order Betokens Profound Rupture

Inescapable Bleak Trajectory

Ultimate Betrayal: Acquiescence Masquerading as Sagacity

1. Vulnerable Economic Foundations Before the Transition

2. Market Shock After 5 August: Immediate Economic Effects

3. Rise of Opportunistic Market Manipulation

a. Syndicates Accelerated Price Manipulation

b. Corruption in Subsidy and Relief Distribution

c. Banking Sector Instability

4. Breakdown of Revenue Systems and the Rise of Informal Extraction

Customs and Ports

Local Government Revenue

Land Administration

5. Investment Freeze and Capital Flight

6. Widening Inequality: How Transitional Instability Hurt Ordinary Citizens

7. Pathways to Economic Stabilization

Conclusion

ARTICLE 3 — SOCIAL UNREST, HUMAN-RIGHTS RISKS, AND PUBLIC INSECURITY DURING THE POST–5 AUGUST PERIOD

Introduction

1. Social Tension Under Transitional Uncertainty

2. Escalation of Community-Level Violence

Political Clashes

Mob Justice

Looting

3. Increased Risks for Women and Marginalized Groups

4. Weakening of Human-Rights Monitoring Mechanisms

5. Media, Misinformation, and Public Panic

Misinformation Circulated Rapidly

Media Under Pressure

6. Breakdown of Social Cohesion

7. Rebuilding Social Stability: Necessary Steps

Conclusion

1. The Governance Vacuum: A Structural Weakness Decades in the Making

2. Law Enforcement Under Stress: Lack of Coordination and Operational Clarity

3. Rise in Local Power Brokers and Informal Governance

4. Administrative Corruption: How Transitional Uncertainty Fuels Abuse

5. Social Unrest: Triggered by Fear, Exploited by Opportunists

6. Public Trust Erosion: Citizens Left Without Predictability

7. What Structural Reforms Are Needed

Conclusion

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